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CONTROLLING BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS:  
HOW THE JAPANESE STANDARD FOR PATENTING 
SOFTWARE COULD BRING REASONABLE 
LIMITATIONS TO BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS  
IN THE UNITED STATES 
James S. Sfekas† 
Abstract: In recent years, the United States has expanded the scope of subject 
matter that can be patented.  The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has evolved a 
standard that allows inventors to patent software as long as it produces a useful and 
tangible result.  Japan has also expanded the scope of patentable subject matter, but in a 
more limited fashion.  Under the Japanese standard, the Japan Patent Office will only 
grant a patent to software inventions that apply a law of nature.  The U.S. standard is too 
generous in allowing patents on software and business methods.  Business method 
patents, in particular, are problematic because they are not consistent with the goals of 
patents and because they stray from the focus on granting patents to technology.  
Software patents, however, should not be overly limited because software is an area of 
technology and because software patents provide value to innovative parts of the 
economy.  The United States should change its standard for determining whether an 
invention claims patentable subject matter by incorporating the Japanese standard.  Under 
this standard, software inventions that control an apparatus or that work based on 
physical properties are considered patentable subject matter.  Software inventions that do 
not meet this requirement will only be considered patentable subject matter if they show 
information processing performed by software as it is implemented in hardware.  This 
standard would put limits on business method patents, including requiring that they be 
technological, while not overly limiting useful software patents.  In addition, 
incorporating the Japanese standard would help the cause of patent law harmonization.  
Patentability of software has been a stumbling block for negotiations to harmonize patent 
law world-wide, but unilateral action in this area would improve the chances of countries 
agreeing to substantive patent law harmonization. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Business methods have historically been excluded from patenting in 
all countries.  However, recently that situation has changed in the United 
States.  After the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled in State 
Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.1 that business 
methods were not excluded from patenting, the number of applications for 
business method patents received by the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
                                           
†
 The author would like to thank Professor Toshiko Takenaka, Deborah Huang, and the editors of 
the Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal for their help in the development of this comment. 
1
 149 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
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(“USPTO”) increased from very few in 1997 to almost 8,000 in 2000.2  
Many commentators in the mass media argue that this has led to a broken 
patent system that grants patents for trivial inventions.3 
A proposed definition of business methods defines one as “a method 
of . . . administering, managing, or otherwise operating an enterprise 
. . . including a technique used in . . . conducting business; or processing 
financial data.”4  The definition also includes techniques used in athletics, 
instruction or personal skill.5  There is some overlap between business 
method patents and software patents, because business method inventions 
are frequently implemented in software.  However, software patents cover a 
wide range of inventions that are not considered business methods.  Because 
of the close connection between the two areas, any discussion of business 
method patents must consider the general category of software patents as 
well. 
Critics of business method patents argue that they are unnecessary and 
that allowing them has led to an increased number of “bad” patents—patents 
that should never have been granted by the patent office.6  Many also argue 
that business method patents should not be allowed because they are abstract 
ideas rather than concrete inventions.7  These same arguments have played 
out in Europe and Japan as well.8  Over the past two decades, national patent 
offices in those countries have changed and broadened the standards for 
what software and business methods may be patented.9  Since the 
government grants a patent monopoly in order to encourage innovation in 
technology,10 it is important to ensure that this monopoly is serving its 
purpose with business method patents.   
This comment argues that the United States should adopt the Japanese 
standard for determining whether a software or business method invention is 
                                           
2
 Bradley D. Lytle and John Dellinger, Business Method Boot Camp: What Every IP Attorney 
Should Know About Business Method Patents, http://www.oblon.com/media/index.php?id=50 (last visited 
May 9, 2006). 
3
 See, e.g., Rob Pegoraro, Blackberry Lawsuit is Patently Absurd, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 26, 
2006, at D01; Eric Chabrow, Patently Absurd – The U.S. Patent System Is in Disarray. Change Requires 
Not Just a Better System, But Better Patents, Too., INFORMATIONWEEK, Feb. 20, 2006, at 36.   
4
 H.R. 5364, 106th Cong. § 2 (2001). 
5
 Id. 
6
 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Essay: Are Business Methods Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268 (May 2000). 
7
 Id. at 266. 
8
 See generally Hideo Furutani, Patentability of Business Method Inventions in Japan Compared 
With the U.S. and Europe 2-8 (2003), http://www.furutani.co.jp/office/ 
ronbun/Business_method_patents_in_Japan.pdf (last visited October 20, 2006) (discussing the evolution of 
standards for patenting business methods in the United States, Japan and Europe). 
9
 Id.  
10
 See infra Part II. 
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patentable subject matter.  The Japanese standard limits business method 
patents while still allowing patents on software.  In addition, changing the 
U.S. standard would be a step toward eliminating one of the biggest 
obstacles to patent law harmonization.  Part II provides a general 
background on common features of patent systems worldwide and describes 
essential concepts for understanding the contrasting standards.  Part III 
explains the U.S. standard for patenting software and business methods and 
how it developed.  Part IV explains the Japanese standard for patenting 
software and business methods.  Part V describes the advantages of software 
patents and objections to business method patents.  Part VI proposes that the 
United States should incorporate the elements of the Japanese standard for 
determining whether a software invention is patentable subject matter, 
because the proposed standard would limit business method patents while 
retaining most of the advantages of software patents.  Part VII discusses how 
this change would also support efforts to harmonize world patent laws. 
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM REPRESENTS A GOVERNMENT-SANCTIONED 
MONOPOLY TO ENCOURAGE INNOVATION 
The patent system is unusual in that it is a government-sanctioned 
monopoly.11  Patents were originally royal grants of monopoly in a particular 
area12 but were outlawed by the Statute of Monopolies, except in the case of 
patent monopolies given to the “first and true inventor” of a “new 
manufacture.”13  The patent monopoly was acceptable because the cost of 
granting the right was balanced by the inventive contribution.14  The 
monopoly was intended to ensure that inventors would be able to enjoy the 
economic benefits of their efforts15 and to provide an incentive for inventors 
to share their inventions with the public.16  Patents were once justified as 
protecting a creator’s moral right to his invention17 and as a reward for 
creating a useful invention,18 but those views have fallen into disfavor. 19 
                                           
11
 FRITZ MACHLUP, AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, Subcomm. on Patents, 
Trademarks & Copyrights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., at III (1958). 
12
 Id. at 2. 
13
 Id. at 2-3. 
14
 Id. at III. 
15
 Id. at 19. 
16
 Id. at 21. 
17
 Id. at 22-23 (discussing the 1791 French patent law, which declared that inventors had a natural 
property right to their inventions). 
18
 Id. at 29. 
19
 See id. at 25-26. 
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In the United States, patents are authorized by Article I, Section 8 of 
the Constitution, which gives Congress the power to grant monopolies on 
“discoveries” in order “[t]o promote the progress of science and the useful 
arts.”20  This has generally been interpreted to mean that patent protection 
can only be granted in the areas of “applied technology.”21  Other countries 
have similar minimum requirements.22   
If the patent examiner finds that the invention is patentable subject 
matter, he must then evaluate whether it meets the utility requirement.  
Under U.S. law, this means an inventor cannot get a patent for an invention 
without knowing what it can be used for.23  In Japan, this is stated as a 
requirement that the invention must be “industrially applicable.”24   
In addition to being useful, an invention must be both novel25 and 
nonobvious.26  An invention is novel if there is no single piece of “prior art,” 
such as a patent or prior publication, that describes or anticipates that 
invention.27  In the United States, an invention is unpatentable under the 
nonobviousness requirement if a person having ordinary skill in the art could 
have created it by combining elements from the prior art.28  Similarly, Japan 
requires that an invention have an “inventive step,”29 which means that a 
patent cannot be granted for an invention which a person having ordinary 
skill in the art could have invented based on known prior art.30 
Every patent application contains a specification, which must present 
sufficient information such that a person having ordinary skill in the art 
could recognize that the inventor has invented what is being claimed.31  The 
specification must also disclose sufficient information so that one skilled in 
the art could make the invention.32  Every application must include “claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
                                           
20
 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
21
 DONALD CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS, § 1.01 (2005).  In this context, “applied technology” is 
used in contrast to “science.”  So, patents are not intended to protect knowledge per se, but the application 
of that knowledge in useful ways.  Id. n.12. 
22
 See, e.g., Japanese Patent Office Examination Guidelines, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-3 [hereinafter 
JPO Examination Guidelines], available at http://www.jpo.go.jp/tetuzuki_e/t_tokkyo_e/1312-002_e.htm 
(listing types of inventions that are not patentable). 
23
 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
24
 Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29.  
25
 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
26
 Id. § 103. 
27
 Id. § 102, Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29. 
28
 See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
29
 Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29(2). 
30
 ZENTARO KITAGAWA, 3-VI-2 DOING BUSINESS IN JAPAN § 2.02[3] (2005). 
31
 Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
32
 Gould v. Hellwarth, 472 F.2d 1383, 1386 (C.C.P.A. 1973). 
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applicant regards as his invention.”33  The claims “define the metes and 
bounds of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the 
invention,”34 although the specification may be used as an aid to interpreting 
the claims.35 
III. THE UNITED STATES HAS STRUGGLED TO DEAL WITH BUSINESS 
METHOD PATENTS 
The standard for patenting business methods has a long history.  Many 
business method patents in recent years have been for business methods 
implemented in software on a general-purpose computer.36  Because of this, 
the standard for determining patentability of software inventions is closely 
linked to the standard for patenting business methods. 
The history of business method patents in the United States began 
with Hotel Security Checking Co. v. Lorraine Co.,37 in which the court noted 
that “[a] system of transacting business disconnected from the means for 
carrying out the system is not . . . an art.”38  This case was the basis for what 
became known as the “business method exception,” which stated that 
business methods are automatically unpatentable abstract ideas.39 
The distinction between technical processes and business methods 
started to blur with the spread of computers, as inventors started to push the 
boundaries of patentable subject matter.40  The Supreme Court first 
attempted to clarify these boundaries in Gottschalk v. Benson,41 where it 
considered the question of whether software was patentable.  The Court held 
that “[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered, mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are not patentable, as they are the basic tools of 
scientific and technological work.”42  Instead, the Court said that patent-
eligible subject matter resulted “from the application of the law of nature to 
produce a new and useful result.”43 
                                           
33
 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000 & Supp. 2003). 
34
 Hilton-Davis Chemical Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1539 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
35
 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
36
 This is true of many of the most controversial business method patents, such as Priceline’s reverse 
auction patent, U.S. Patent No. 5,794,207 (filed Sep. 4, 1996) and Amazon.com’s 1-click patent, U.S. 
Patent No. 5,960,411 (filed Sep. 12, 1997). 
37
 160 F. 467 (2d Cir. 1908). 
38
 Id. at 469.  The patent was actually found invalid based on other criteria.  Id. at 472. 
39
 See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting); State Street 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 927 F. Supp. 502, 515 (D. Mass. 1996). 
40
 CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[5]. 
41
 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
42
 Id. at 67. 
43
 Id., quoting Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
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This ruling was supplemented in Parker v. Flook.44  The Court held 
that while including a law of nature or mathematical algorithm did not 
automatically disqualify patentability,45 an invention had to include “some 
other inventive concept in its application” in order to be patentable.46  The 
USPTO interpreted Flook to bar any computer-related inventions from 
patentability and rejected all applications for patents on such inventions.47   
However, the Supreme Court soon contradicted this interpretation in 
Diamond v. Diehr,48 holding that a process for curing rubber did not become 
unpatentable just because one part was controlled by a computer.49  The 
Court first noted that “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas” are specifically denied patentability.50  However, the Court then held 
that “an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known 
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”51  After 
Diehr, the question became whether the formula described in the claim was 
part of a structure or process that “when considered as a whole, is 
performing a function which the patent laws were designed to protect (e.g., 
transforming or reducing an article to a different state or thing . . . .”52 
At about the same time the Supreme Court ruled on Diehr, the Court 
significantly broadened the scope of patentable subject matter for 
biotechnology inventions in Diamond v. Chakrabarty.53  In allowing the 
applicant to patent a type of bacteria, the Court said, “In choosing such 
expansive terms as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter,’ modified by 
the comprehensive ‘any,’ Congress plainly contemplated that the patent laws 
would be given wide scope.”54  The Court then noted that “Congress 
intended statutory subject matter to ‘include anything under the sun that is 
made by man.’”55 
In the years after Flook and Diehr, the Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit developed the Freeman-Walter-Abele test to limit the 
patentability of software inventions.56  However, in the 1990s, momentum 
                                           
44
 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
45
 Id. at 590. 
46
 Id. at 594. 
47
 CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[6][f]. 
48
 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
49
 Id. at 187. 
50
 Id. at 185. 
51
 Id. at 187. 
52
 Id. at 192. 
53
 447 U.S. 303 (1980). 
54
 Id. at 308. 
55
 Id. at 309. 
56
 CHISUM, supra note 21, § 1.03[6][i]. 
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started to build in favor of relaxing the standards for patentable subject 
matter.57  In In re Alappat,58 the Federal Circuit held that an invention would 
not be eliminated from patentability just because the claim “would read on a 
general-purpose computer programmed to carry out the invention.”59 
In State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc.,60 
the Federal Circuit completely eliminated the mathematical algorithm and 
business method exceptions.  The court held that mathematical algorithms 
were excluded from patentability only insofar as they were abstract ideas, 
but they were not inherently excluded.61  The court then held that an 
algorithm was patentable if it was used to create a “useful, concrete and 
tangible result.”62  Finally, the court eliminated the business method 
exception, noting that there was no statutory or caselaw support for it.63  A 
year later, in AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications, Inc.,64 the court 
broadened the State Street holding to include process claims, in addition to 
machine claims of the type at issue in State Street.65 
Unsurprisingly, the number of business method patent applications 
increased significantly in the years immediately following State Street and 
AT&T Corp.  While previously there had been few business method patent 
applications, the USPTO received 2,821 applications in 1999.66  The 
following year, that number rose to 7,800.67  The USPTO has implemented a 
number of measures to handle the increase,68 but the backlog in applications 
continues to grow.69 
                                           
57
 See, e.g., In re Schrader, 22 F.3d 290, 298 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (Newman, J., dissenting) (arguing that 
the business method exception was poorly defined and unnecessary and that cases supporting the business 
method exception were actually decided on other grounds, such as novelty or nonobviousness). 
58
 In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
59
 Id. at 1545. 
60
 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
61
 Id. at 1373. 
62
 Id. 
63
 Id. at 1375. 
64
 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999).  
65
 Id. at 1358.  
66
 Lytle and Dellinger, supra note 2.  
67
 Id. 
68
 See generally United States Patent and Trademark Office, A USPTO White Paper: Automated 
Financial or Management Data Processing Methods (Business Methods), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/menu/busmethp/whitepaper.pdf.   
69
 Dennis Crouch, Updated Business Method Patent Statistics, PATENTLY-O: PATENT LAW BLOG, 
http://patentlaw.typepad.com/patent/2005/05/updated_busines.html (last visited April 25, 2006).  
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IV. JAPAN ALSO HAS STRUGGLED TO FIND THE RIGHT STANDARD FOR 
SOFTWARE AND BUSINESS METHOD PATENTS 
Japan has taken a different path in dealing with the challenges 
presented by software and business method patents.  Japan is one of the most 
important countries in the world patent system, with nineteen percent of 
patents in force in 2003;70 therefore, its system offers lessons that are 
applicable to the United States as well. 
Under the Japanese system, the general rules for patentability apply to 
all inventions, including software.71  In addition, software inventions are 
subject to special treatment under a second set of rules that specifically 
address computer-related inventions.72 
A. Japanese Patent Law Requires That All Patentable Inventions Apply a 
Law of Nature and Be Applicable to Industrial Use 
The Japanese standard for patentable subject matter has a shorter and 
somewhat less tempestuous history than the U.S. standard.  Unlike the 
relaxed U.S. standard, the Japanese standard is stricter and more complex. 
Japanese patent law defines an invention as “the highly advanced 
creation of technical ideas by which a law of nature is utilized.”73  In this 
context, the word “highly” is not used for determining patentability but is 
used only to distinguish patents from utility models, which provide a lower 
level of protection for an invention.74  Therefore, the key requirement for a 
device or process to be considered a patentable invention is that it must be a 
creation of technical ideas that uses a law of nature. 
The word “nature,” in the Japanese patent law, is used in the same 
sense as “natural science.”75  Discovery of a law of nature is not sufficient – 
in order to be a patentable invention, the invention must apply a law of 
nature to solve a particular problem.76  Some inventions that have been 
denied patents on this basis include an advertising method and a method for 
making a telegraphic code combining Roman letters, figures and signs.77  
                                           
70
 In 2003, 49% of patents in force were in the United States or Japan.  TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, 
TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT: 2004 EDITION 5, available at http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2004/ 
tsr2004.pdf.    
71
 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part VII, Chapter 1, at 2. 
72
 Id. 
73
 Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 2.  
74
 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1. 
75
 KITAGAWA, supra note 30, § 2.01[1]. 
76
 Id. § 2.01[3]. 
77
 Id. § 2.01[1].   
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The Japan Patent Office (“JPO”) examination guidelines list a number of 
categories of invention that are unpatentable for not meeting this 
requirement.78  Most importantly, they exclude patentability for inventions 
that use laws other than laws of nature, such as economic laws or arbitrary 
arrangements.79  The guidelines exclude computer programming languages 
and pure business methods from patentability on this basis.80   
In addition to the base requirement defined above, the invention must 
be capable of industrial use.81  The JPO examination guidelines note that 
“‘[i]ndustry’ is interpreted in a broad sense, including mining, agriculture, 
fishery, transportation, telecommunications, etc., as well as 
manufacturing.”82  The examination guidelines enumerate a set of inventions 
that are considered industrially inapplicable, such as medical procedures 
performed on humans.83  Also included are commercially inapplicable 
inventions, such as methods with purely personal uses (e.g. a method for 
smoking) and inventions applied only for scientific or experimental 
purposes.84   
B. The JPO Provides Special Treatment for Computer-Related Inventions 
Rather than use a one-size-fits-all approach, the JPO sets special 
guidelines for determining patentability of software inventions.  These 
special requirements ensure that software inventions meet the base 
requirement that a patentable invention must “utiliz[e] a law of nature.”85  A 
business method implemented in software may be patentable if the invention 
meets these requirements.86 
The JPO made an early attempt to define standards for patentability of 
software with examination guidelines issued in 1975.87  The guidelines 
stated that software was only patentable when it was incorporated into an 
apparatus or system.88  An example of this requirement is using software to 
control the operation of an industrial process in a mill.89  The JPO set this 
requirement to ensure that software inventions would meet the “law of 
                                           
78
 See JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-3. 
79
 See id., Part II, Chapter 1, at 1-2. 
80
 See id., Part II, Chapter 1, at 2. 
81
 Tokkyo Hō [Patent Law], Law No. 121 of 1959, art. 29. 
82
 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part II, Chapter 1, at 4. 
83
 Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 4. 
84
 Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 7. 
85
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 11. 
86
 Id. Part II, Chapter 1, at 2-3. 
87
 Furutani, supra note 8, at 2-3. 
88
 KITAGAWA, supra note 30, § 2.01[7]. 
89
 Id. 
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nature” requirement of the patent law.90  Under the 1975 standards, computer 
languages were specifically declared unpatentable, because they were just 
symbolic codes.91  Also considered unpatentable were programs for 
processing data, because they were "regarded as merely methods for 
displaying or reporting social or natural phenomena by an assembly of 
numerals or symbols."92  The JPO applied these standards in 1980 to deny a 
patent on a method for classifying data using a computer, because the 
invention was related to a mathematical operation rather than control of a 
computer.93   
In 1993, the JPO issued a new version of the examination guidelines 
that relaxed the standard.94  The new guidelines allowed patentability for 
computer programs that handled non-technical operations, such as word 
processing, if the programs were carried out using hardware resources on the 
computer.95  The JPO also eliminated the “Point of Novelty Approach,” 
under which the patent office evaluated the patentability of an invention 
based only on the novel part of the invention.96  Instead, patentability was to 
be determined based on the whole invention.97 
In 2000, the JPO issued its latest version of the Examination 
Guidelines, which remains in effect.98  The JPO’s goal for the latest version 
was to update its guidelines to better handle business method patents.99  The 
changes focused on the standards for determining whether inventions meet 
the inventive step requirement.100 
Under the current examination guidelines for software-related patents, 
inventors may claim both methods and products. 101  A method claim defines 
the invention by a series of operations in a time series. 102  A product claim 
defines the invention in terms of the functions performed by the software.103  
In addition, all claims must clearly show that a computer is performing the 
                                           
90
 Id. 
91
 Id. 
92
 Id. 
93
 Furutani, supra note 8, at 3. 
94
 Id. 
95
 Id. 
96
 Id. 
97
 Id. 
98
 Id. at 3-4. 
99
 TRILATERAL CO-OPERATION, TRILATERAL STATISTICAL REPORT 2001 10, available at 
http://www.trilateral.net/tsr/tsr_2001/tsr_2001.pdf. 
100
 SHINJIRO ONO, SUBSTANTIVE PATENT HARMONIZATION AND JAPAN’S STANCE 4, 
http://www.law.washington.edu/casrip/Symposium/Number8/CM%20-%20Ono.pdf (last visited May 11, 
2006).  
101
 JPO Examination Guidelines, supra note 22, Part VII, Chapter 1, at 3. 
102
 Id. 
103
 Id. 
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actions described.104  According to the JPO, failing to do so may make the 
claims invalid because they do not meet the requirement that the “invention 
. . . must be clearly stated.”105  For example, an inventor cannot simply claim 
“[a]n order-receiving method using a computer, comprising the steps 
of . . . ”, because the claim would be unclear as to whether the steps were to 
be carried out by a computer or by a human using the computer for 
assistance.106 
Although the examination guidelines have a special section for 
computer-related inventions, not every invention that uses software is 
required to be evaluated using that section.107  For instance, if the application 
claims subject matter that is specifically non-statutory, such as an invention 
that applies economic laws only or that is mere presentation of data, the 
invention is not patentable.108  In contrast, some inventions clearly make use 
of a law of nature, without any need to consider the special rules.109  These 
inventions can simply be evaluated under the general examination 
guidelines.110  If the invention uses a computer to control an apparatus, such 
as a rice cooker, it should be evaluated under the general requirements for 
industrial inventions.111  Similarly, if the invention is a computer that works 
based on physical properties of an object, such as the rotation rate of an 
engine, it should be evaluated under the general requirements.112 
If the invention cannot be evaluated under the general requirements, it 
will be evaluated under the software-specific standards.  These requirements 
ensure that the claimed software invention uses a law of nature.113  To be 
patentable, a software invention must claim “information processing by 
software [that] is concretely realized by using hardware resources.”114  That 
is, the claims must describe how the computer reads the software and uses 
the software in combination with the computer hardware to perform 
arithmetic or information manipulation.115  Even if the specification 
                                           
104
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 5.  
105
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 4 (quoting Japanese Patent Law, Section 36(6)(ii)). 
106
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 4-5. 
107
 See id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 12-13. 
108
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 13. 
109
 Id. 
110
 Id. 
111
 Id.  
112
 Id. 
113
 Id. Part VII, Chapter 1, at 11. 
114
 Id.  
115
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describes a patentable system, the system will not be patentable unless the 
claims describe hardware and software working together.116  This is distinct 
from the U.S. standard, which does not require any reference to hardware.117   
The JPO has struggled with the same set of issues as the USPTO in 
determining how to deal with software and business method patents.  Unlike 
the United States, Japan has not abandoned subject matter as a restriction on 
patentability.  Instead, Japan has developed a specialized set of rules to 
ensure that software inventions meet the general requirement that patentable 
inventions must use a law of nature.  In addition, the JPO has carved out a 
group of software patents that do not require special treatment.  In doing so, 
the JPO has attempted to find a balance between allowing patents in a broad 
area of technology and maintaining reasonable restrictions on the types of 
allowable patents. 
V. THE U.S. PATENT SYSTEM SHOULD ADOPT A STANDARD THAT ALLOWS 
PATENTS FOR USEFUL SOFTWARE INVENTIONS BUT LIMITS PATENTS ON 
BUSINESS METHODS 
The standard for determining what is patentable subject matter should 
first ensure that the patent rights granted are sufficient to encourage the 
development of new fields of technology.  This should be balanced against 
the need to ensure that there are sufficient limits on the monopoly rights 
being granted to new technology.  Because the categories of software patents 
and business method patents are closely related, any standard that affects 
one will tend to affect the other.  The United States should adopt a new 
standard that balances the need to encourage innovation in software with the 
equally important need to limit patents on inventions that are purely methods 
of doing business. 
                                                                                                                              
A system for transferring electric notes between electronic modules, comprising: 
 electronic modules, each of which has a processor and memory therein, wherein the electronic 
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receiving the electronic notes through the cryptographically secure channel, and memorizing the 
electronic notes into the memory; 
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A. Software Inventions Should Be Patentable Because They Serve Useful 
Economic Purposes 
In many industries, functions that would have been implemented in 
hardware in the past are now implemented in software.  The Supreme Court 
recognized this practice in Diamond v. Diehr,118 when it held that a 
manufacturing process did not become unpatentable simply because a 
general-purpose computer was involved in one step.119  Most modern 
software patents are for similar inventions that merely shift functionality 
from hardware to software.  The vast majority of software patents are 
acquired by companies in industries other than the software industry.120  A 
recent study found that manufacturing companies in the United States 
received seventy-five percent of software patents, compared to thirteen 
percent for companies in software publishing and services.121  Patents from 
manufacturing companies tend to be for manufacturing processes, so there is 
little risk that the companies will attempt to claim abstract ideas.   
Software patents are useful within the software industry as well.  
Recent history suggests that the software industry can benefit from the 
incentives provided by patents.  For many years, economists wondered why 
businesses’ increased use of computers and information technology did not 
result in faster productivity growth.122  For the two decades prior to 1995, 
productivity growth in the United States averaged only 1.5% a year, despite 
efficiency improvements expected from increased computerization of the 
workplace. 123  However, since 1995, productivity growth has doubled to 
three percent per year and remained high even as the country went through a 
recession and slow economic recovery.124  Some economists have suggested 
that the increase came as businesses adapted to take advantage of the new 
technology.125   
This adaptation to new technology suggests that there may be some 
benefit to allowing patents on software to encourage further development in 
the area.  It is possible that the key to increased productivity was not the 
introduction of computers into the workplace, but the introduction of useful 
new applications that allow businesses to better make use of those 
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computers.126  Allowing patents on nonobvious but incremental 
improvements in business software might be the incentive that is needed to 
encourage businesses to take advantage of the technology. 
More concretely, software patents provide a boost to many software 
startups, which produce some of the most important innovations in the 
software industry.127  A recent survey of venture capitalists and executives 
from software startups found that patents can be very useful to startups that 
have begun marketing their products.128  The survey found that patents do 
not provide much advantage to pre-revenue startups because of the costs of 
enforcing a patent and because the company does not yet have a product to 
protect.129  However, the same survey also found that a patent can help a 
company in the early days of selling its product by allowing continued 
innovation free from competition.130  A patent can also encourage larger 
companies to acquire the startup by providing information about the 
startup’s innovations.131   
These benefits sufficiently justify allowing software patents.  
However, such justifications should not extend so far as to cover business 
method patents as well. 
B. The Costs of Business Method Patents Outweigh the Benefits 
One major concern with business method patents is that they are often 
of lower quality, meaning that they should have been denied patentability 
based on novelty or nonobviousness.  In particular, there are many patents 
that have been awarded on relatively mundane business inventions.132  For 
instance, inventions such as online shopping carts, 133 online credit card 
payments,134 and online affiliate programs135 have received patents that some 
advocacy groups argue should have been denied as obvious or lacking 
novelty. 136  Under State Street, business method patents are supposed to be 
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held to the same requirements as other types of patents,137 but they pose 
special challenges that make them harder for examiners to reject.138  A 
particular problem is that patent examiners rarely cite non-patent prior art.139  
This makes business method patents more likely to be granted, because the 
field lacks prior art patents.140  Many well-known business methods are 
poorly documented for use in a patent search, because they are implemented 
in policies and practices that are not easily accessible to a patent examiner.141  
In addition, prior to State Street, businesses that invented new business 
methods were more likely to protect them using trade secret law.142  As such, 
an examiner would not be able to find information about these secret 
business methods to use as prior art when examining new applications.143  
In infringement trials, these poor-quality patents should be found 
invalid, because the defendants have a much greater incentive to bring 
forward invalidating prior art.  However, in some cases the subjective 
element of the evaluation will unfairly influence the judge’s decision.144  
Judges are more likely to find inventions patentable in poorly-known or 
poorly-understood fields.145  This tendency may favor certain hard-to-
understand types of business method patents.146   
Even if these low-quality patents are eventually invalidated by a court, 
they can still cause damage.  The possibility of an injunction if they lose a 
lawsuit leads many accused infringers to settle rather than risk a trial.147  
Accused infringers often prefer to avoid the costs of litigation and choose to 
settle, even if the patent being asserted is likely to be invalid.148  In addition, 
even if the patent is eventually found invalid, it can have major effects on 
the market because the patent owner is able to gain advantages that do not 
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disappear after invalidation.149  The time during which the patentee received 
erroneous patent protection might be enough to gain customer loyalty 
sufficient to maintain its advantage afterwards.150   
The litigation between Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble over 
Amazon’s 1-click patent151 provides a concrete example of these problems.  
Amazon.com received a patent in 1999 on a system that allowed customers 
to buy items without having to re-enter their shipping and billing data and 
quickly sued Barnes & Noble, who had a similar system on their site, for 
patent infringement.152  Many groups believed the patent to be invalid, but 
Barnes & Noble settled after two years rather than incur the expense of 
continued litigation.153  This demonstrates how companies prefer to settle 
rather than to fight a potentially invalid patent at trial.  To understand the 
advantages that an invalid patent may provide, imagine that Amazon’s patent 
had been found invalid after several years of litigation.  By this time, 
Amazon’s customers would have become accustomed to the convenience of 
shopping at Amazon compared to other online retailers.  Even though other 
retailers would now be able to provide the same convenience, many 
customers would stay with the website with which they were familiar.  In 
this way, the “stickiness” of a service like 1-click could provide advantages 
even if the patent were eventually found invalid.154 
An additional objection to business method patents is that they may be 
unnecessary.  The patent system is intended to provide an incentive for 
invention and public propagation of such inventions.155  Therefore, before 
patent protection is extended to a new field, there should be some 
consideration of whether that protection is necessary to achieve those goals.  
The key question is whether the incentive provided by the patent monopoly 
is large enough to balance the loss to the economy from the monopoly.156 
The process of evaluating the value of business method patents is 
made more difficult by the fact that some people, generally patent holders, 
believe that any idea or concept that has value should be protected by the 
law.157  However, the U.S. legal system has never gone that far.  The Framers 
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of the Constitution rejected the “just deserts”158 approach, the idea that the 
patent is a reward for invention, in favor of the result-oriented statement that 
Congress could create a patent system to “promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts . . . .”159  Therefore, the decision on whether to allow a class 
of patents should be based on a balancing of costs and benefits. 
Of course, there is an argument in favor of allowing business method 
patents—that is, providing protection for business method inventions 
encourages innovation in business methods just as it would any other area.160  
In general, the legal system recognizes a property right when it is necessary 
to prevent a tragedy of the commons, i.e. to prevent free-riders.161  The 
argument, then, is that if business methods are patentable, businesses will 
have an incentive to develop new methods in order to get their own 
protection and to work around those methods already patented by 
competitors.162   
However, this argument does not justify allowing business method 
patents because the same incentive is already built into the free market 
system.163  Companies must develop more efficient or more effective 
methods of doing business in order to succeed against their competitors.164  
In fact, an effective business method can be its own reward.165  Sticky 
business methods that bring customer loyalty or network effects will bring 
competitive advantage to the company that invents those methods, even 
without patent protection.166  As Professor Rochelle Dreyfuss of New York 
University said, “With lock in, network effects, and even good old fashioned 
loyalty, lead time (the first mover advantage) goes a long way to assuring 
returns adequate to recoup costs and earn substantial profit.”167  While 
innovation in business methods is a good thing, it is likely that there would 
be the same level of innovation even without patents on them. 
Not only does the free market system make business method patents 
unnecessary, such patents can actually be damaging to the free market 
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system.168  The system works based on the idea that companies are 
competing on a level playing field, so that the best and most efficient 
company will win.169  Just like in a sporting event, the rules should be equal 
for both sides.170  By giving a patent monopoly on particular business 
practices, the government distorts the operation of the free market system 
and reduces the gains from the operation of the market.171  In the free market 
system, players should succeed in the free market based on superior skill and 
implementation. 
A particular problem in the United States is that business method 
patents do not have to be technological.  This is inconsistent with the 
Constitution and with Supreme Court precedent.  The Framers did not intend 
“useful arts” to mean every created thing.172  At the time, the term “useful 
arts” was commonly used in contrast to the ideas of the “liberal arts” and the 
“fine arts,” which were well-known ideas in the eighteenth century.173  In In 
re Bergy,174 the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, the predecessor court 
to the Federal Circuit, described a technological requirement when it noted 
that “the present day equivalent of the term ‘useful arts’ employed by the 
Founding Fathers is ‘technological arts.’”175 
The Supreme Court also laid out a similar requirement in Benson and 
Diehr.  In setting the standards for patenting software, the Court in Benson 
and Diehr cited Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co. to support the 
holding that patentable subject matter must result “from the application of 
the law of nature to produce a new and useful end.”176  One definition of 
technology is simply that it is applied science.177  Since science is an attempt 
to understand the laws of nature, the Court’s holdings in Benson and Diehr 
are really stating a requirement that inventions must be technological.178  
However, when the Federal Circuit eliminated the business method 
exception in State Street, they restated the standard for patentable subject 
matter as simply something that produces a “useful, concrete and tangible 
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result.”  In the process, the court eliminated the Supreme Court’s 
requirement that patentable inventions must also be “applications of the law 
of nature.” 
A recent case before the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences 
(“BPAI”), Ex parte Lundgren,179 demonstrates this lack of a technology 
requirement.  The patent at issue in Lundgren claimed a method for 
determining the compensation of managers in industries that are susceptible 
to collusion.180  Unlike common practice for business method patents, the 
Lundgren application did not describe the use of a computer as part of the 
implementation.181  The examiner rejected the application as “nothing more 
than an abstract idea which is not associated or connected to any 
technological art.”182  The BPAI overruled the rejection, holding that there 
was no separate requirement that patents must be in the “technological arts” 
in order to be patentable subject matter.183  In so doing, the BPAI showed 
that the current standard for patentable subject matter has left behind the 
constitutional requirement that patents arise from the “useful arts” and be an 
“application of the law of nature.” 
Finally, the fundamental problem with business method patents is the 
difficulty of differentiating between processes that are principles and those 
that are patentable applications.184  The challenge is to keep people from 
patenting laws of nature or abstract concepts.185  The Freeman-Walter-Abele 
test tried to solve this by ensuring that software inventions must show a 
connection to a physical implementation in order to receive a patent.186  
When the Federal Circuit swept away that requirement in State Street, it 
became much easier to patent abstract concepts.  The United States should 
move towards a standard that would limit this danger. 
VI. INCORPORATING THE JAPANESE STANDARD FOR DETERMINING 
PATENTABILITY OF SOFTWARE INVENTIONS WOULD BETTER ENABLE 
THE UNITED STATES TO GRANT PATENTS FOR SOFTWARE INVENTIONS 
WHILE DENYING PATENTS TO BUSINESS METHODS 
There are a number of problems with business method patents in the 
United States.  The challenge is to construct a standard for patentability in 
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this area that restricts the patenting of business methods but does not exclude 
patenting desirable software inventions.  At the same time, a new standard 
for patentable subject matter should reinstate the “law of nature” 
requirement that the Federal Circuit failed to retain in State Street.187  The 
United States should accomplish this by combining the standards of the 
Japanese and U.S. systems.   
The proposed standard would have two overarching requirements.  
First, it would require that a patentable invention must be a technical idea 
implementing a law of nature.  Second, it would modify the utility 
requirement by combining the U.S. requirement of utility with the parallel 
Japanese requirement of industrial applicability. 
To ensure that inventions meet the requirement of implementing a law 
of nature, the proposed standard would use the elaboration provided by 
Japanese law.  First, inventions that use software to control an apparatus or 
that work by processing data about an object will always be considered 
statutory and should be evaluated based on the other patentability 
requirements, such as novelty and nonobviousness.188  Under Japanese law, 
some classes of software inventions are not subject to special treatment for 
determining whether they meet the law of nature requirement.189  Patents to 
inventions that use software to control an apparatus or that work based on 
physical properties of an object are considered statutory and are treated as 
regular industrial inventions, rather than as software patents.190  The 
proposed standard would retain this exclusion.  This would be consistent 
with the Supreme Court’s ruling in Diehr, since the invention found 
patentable in that case used software to control a manufacturing process.191   
If the invention is not considered an application of a law of nature 
based on the first test, it can meet the requirement by showing “information 
processing by software . . . concretely realized by using hardware 
resources.”192  Under the Japanese standard, the claims must specifically 
show how the invention uses software to control hardware to achieve a 
useful result.193  The proposed standard would use this requirement as a 
second stage to ensure that software inventions meet the requirement of 
implementing a law of nature. 
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Under the proposed standard, software inventions would still be held 
to a utility requirement.  In addition to the U.S. requirement that an 
invention constitutes patentable subject matter if it is used to create a 
“useful, concrete and tangible result,” 194 software inventions would have to 
be applicable to industrial use as defined under Japanese law.  These 
requirements are similar but have been applied slightly differently. 195  Under 
the proposed standard, software inventions would have to meet both versions 
of the requirement.  This new requirement would include the JPO’s list of 
inventions that are specifically excluded from patenting because they are by 
definition not industrial. 196  The combination of the technical idea and 
industrial use requirements limits patentability by excluding certain 
inventions such as those with purely personal use and those that do not make 
use of laws of nature.197   
A. The Proposed Standard Provides Reasonable Limitations on Business 
Method Patents 
The proposed standard offers an effective way to re-impose a 
technology requirement on patentable subject matter.  First, it would 
explicitly restore the requirement that inventions must apply a law of nature 
in order to be patentable.  However, this alone is inadequate because of the 
difficulty in applying such a requirement.  Although a technological 
requirement would be useful and consistent with the historical understanding 
of the patent system, it is very difficult to come up with a legally useful 
definition of technology.198  This is particularly a challenge with software 
inventions, since the functioning of software often does not directly depend 
on laws of nature.199   
The Japanese elaboration on the law of nature requirement provides a 
useful mechanism for dealing with this challenge.  To do so, it provides rules 
for determining if an invention is technological that are explicit and 
relatively easy to apply.  At the first stage, an examiner merely has to 
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determine whether the software portion of the invention is interacting with 
physical devices or physical data,200 both of which can be determined easily 
from the claims.  If there is no clear interaction with the physical, the claims 
can meet the requirements by directly describing the interaction between 
hardware and software.201  Thus, the standard gives clear guidance to 
examiners.  In the same way, it gives clear guidance to applicants so that 
they know what they have to do to ensure that their invention meets the law 
of nature requirement. 
A particular advantage of adopting the Japanese standard is that, as an 
existing standard, it has already been tested.  The Japanese standard has been 
applied to deny some of the most controversial business method patents.  
The JPO denied patents to several famous business methods that were 
allowed in the United States, such as Priceline.com’s reverse auction 
invention202 and the Japanese version of the patent that was at issue in State 
Street. 
In addition, the requirement that inventions be industrially applicable 
would enforce a form of technological requirement.  One proposed 
definition is that technology is “knowledge that is applied toward material 
enterprise, guided by an orientation to the external environment and the 
necessity of design.”203  The Japanese requirement of industrial applicability 
is very similar to this definition, particularly with its emphasis on interaction 
with the physical environment.204  This is also consistent with an intuitive 
understanding of what technology means.  Thus, this requirement would pull 
the patent law back towards a minimum technology requirement.  By 
incorporating the requirement that the invention produce a “useful, concrete 
and tangible result,” the new standard would maintain the existing U.S. 
requirement.  
The proposed standard would also help to improve the quality of 
business method patents.  In part, it would do this by forcing all business 
method patents to be claimed as software patents.  Currently, an examiner 
searching for prior art on a business method patent has limited options for 
finding prior art.  Since historically companies have preferred to keep 
business methods as trade secrets,205 examiners have difficulty finding 
relevant prior art, even for well-known ideas.  Applying the proposed 
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standard shifts those patents into the field of software, where there is 
significantly more prior art. 
Not only would confining business method patents to their software 
and hardware implementations make the prior art search easier, it would also 
limit their applicability to those implementations.  The proposed standard 
limits the scope of the patent to the particular implementation in hardware 
and software.  In so doing, it limits the scope of the patent monopoly and 
gives competitors more opportunities to design around those limitations.  
Also, by making it easier to deny patentability based on subject matter, the 
standard reduces the chances that bad patents will make it through 
prosecution and later be found invalid in court. 
B. At the Same Time, the Proposed Standard Maintains the Benefits of 
Software Patents 
Any proposed change in standards for patentability of business 
methods should rein in the negative elements of business method patents 
while maintaining the benefits of software patents.  The combined standard 
proposed here succeeds in doing this by bringing only a few restrictions to 
software patents as a side effect of putting stronger restrictions on business 
method patents. 
The proposed standard would not affect the decision of the PTO for 
most software patents, because it short-circuits the evaluation for inventions 
that use software to control an apparatus or that process data about an object.  
Manufacturing companies receive the majority of software patents.206  Even 
in the software industry itself, companies in areas such as graphics and 
image processing are more likely to obtain patents than companies 
developing internet software or financial software.207  Inventions patented by 
manufacturing companies generally use software to control manufacturing 
processes, so those inventions would automatically be considered patentable 
subject matter under the proposed standard.  Similarly, inventions in the 
areas of graphics and image processing use physical properties of an object, 
either for input data or for output, so those inventions would automatically 
be considered patentable. 
In effect, the first part of the law of nature requirement means that the 
other new restrictions on software patents do not apply to the majority of 
inventions where patentability is uncontroversial.  For example, inventions 
that use software to control devices have been patentable since Diehr and are 
                                           
206
 Bessen and Hunt, supra note 120, at 15. 
207
 Mann, supra note 127, at 988. 
220 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 16 NO. 1 
 
 
rarely considered when commentators discuss software patents.  More 
importantly, inventions that use software to control physical objects or that 
work based on physical properties of the invention are bound in the physical 
world and cannot be considered business methods.  Instead, they use 
software to assist real-world activities that are already considered patentable.  
Looked at another way, these inventions use software to perform the exact 
function that would have been done in hardware in the past.  An explicit rule 
on this subject adds certainty in an area that is not particularly controversial, 
while applying an additional set of principles to a more difficult question. 
A minority of inventions will still be affected by the restrictions, but 
the limitations are not unreasonable.  Software inventors would probably 
prefer not to have to incorporate hardware into their patent claims.  Software 
engineers tend to design in terms of layers of abstraction so that they can 
develop programs for an operating system without having to consider the 
hardware underneath.208  The proposed standard would require them to break 
through these layers of abstraction in order to write their claims.  In addition, 
incorporating hardware elements into software claims limits the scope of 
those claims, which could limit inventors’ ability to claim infringement at 
some later time.   
However, engineers will still be able to write their claims in such a 
way that they incorporate software interacting with hardware.  That is, in the 
context of software patents, the rule just requires that patent drafters rethink 
their view of the invention.  It does not require that the drafters rethink the 
invention.   
VII. THE PROPOSED STANDARD WOULD ASSIST EFFORTS TO HARMONIZE 
PATENT LAWS WORLDWIDE 
Moving the United States toward the Japanese standard for patenting 
software would also benefit efforts to harmonize international patent laws.  
The inherent benefits of harmonization, including lower costs for inventors 
and patent offices, are an additional incentive for the United States to adopt 
the Japanese standard. 
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A. Progress Toward Patent Law Harmonization Has Sped Up in Recent 
Years 
Efforts towards patent law harmonization have been fitful in the past, 
with little progress towards actual harmonization until recent years.  Most 
harmonization negotiations have set minimum levels of protection for 
patents or have harmonized procedural aspects of patent law.  However, in 
the past decade, countries have made more progress in harmonizing 
substantive patent law. 
Prior to the 1990s, patent treaties focused on setting minimum 
requirements for patent protection and simplifying procedural formalities.  
The Paris Convention, which went into effect in 1884,209 set base standards 
for the patent systems of all signatory countries, including requiring that 
signatory countries provide the same rights to nationals of other signatory 
countries as they provide to their own nationals.210  The Patent Cooperation 
Treaty, which went into effect in 1978,211 supplemented this by simplifying 
procedural aspects for filing patent applications in multiple countries.212  In 
1994, the World Trade Organization’s Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) imposed new substantive 
requirements.213  In particular, it required that all member countries grant 
patents to “any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of 
technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are 
capable of industrial application.”214 
The most recent effort on patent law harmonization is the Patent Law 
Treaty (“PLT”).  PLT negotiations began in the 1980s as an attempt to 
harmonize patent law worldwide, but in the early 1990s the United States 
decided against further participation.215  The U.S. withdrawal stopped 
progress on the treaty.216  Despite its withdrawal from the process, the 
United States continued to move its system towards harmonization with the 
rest of the world.217  First, it continued to work on other patent-related 
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treaties, such as TRIPS.218  It eventually continued negotiations on 
harmonizing the formality and procedural requirements for patent 
applications, which led to a more limited version of the PLT that went into 
effect in 2000.219  Second, the United States unilaterally changed a number 
of aspects of its law that were out-of-step with the rest of the world.220  
These changes eliminated many U.S.-only aspects of the law.221  For 
example, the new law provided for publication of applications eighteen 
months after filing222 and allowed inventors to file provisional 
applications.223  The process is continuing, as Congress is currently 
considering a new patent reform law224 that will make additional changes to 
bring U.S. practice in line with the rest of the world, most importantly 
shifting U.S. law to a first-to-file system for determining priority of 
invention.225  
Since agreeing on procedural harmonization through the PLT, 
negotiators have continued work on substantive harmonization with the 
Substantive Patent Law Treaty.226  The negotiations have covered elements 
of substantive patent law such as definitions of prior art227 and the 
enablement requirement.228  In the earlier stages of the negotiations, the 
treaty did not include a technology requirement in its standard for patentable 
subject matter.229  In later sessions, the parties have discussed whether to add 
a requirement that patentable inventions must be “in all fields of 
technology,”230 or whether to leave out that limitation.231  In 2002, the 
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negotiators agreed to postpone further consideration of the question,232 
which is where negotiations currently stand.233 
B. Patent Law Harmonization Brings Significant Benefits to All 
Stakeholders in the Patent System 
The benefits of harmonization significantly outweigh its costs.  The 
most significant cost of harmonization is that it eliminates some of the 
experimentation that comes from having different standards in different 
countries.  Just as federalism allows U.S. states to experiment with laws to 
best fit local conditions, so the diversity of patent laws throughout the world 
may allow countries to tailor their laws to fit local needs.  For instance, 
countries like the United States or Japan, which depend on technology for 
economic growth, can create strong patents to encourage inventors to 
advance the state of the art.  In contrast, developing countries, which need to 
adapt to existing technology, may find that their needs are better served by 
weaker protection. 
On the other hand, this loss is heavily outweighed by the benefits of 
harmonization to inventors and to national patent systems.  The most 
obvious benefit is that harmonization can reduce costs to the applicants.234  
The benefit of substantive patent law harmonization is that applicants will 
have to do less tailoring to prepare their applications for filing in different 
countries.  Although there will still be the costs associated with translations 
and the like, harmonization allows applicants to avoid having to significantly 
change claims and descriptions in each application.  In this respect, 
substantive patent law harmonization is similar to the PCT, which reduced 
costs for applicants by allowing them to file a single application to claim 
priority in multiple countries.235   
Harmonization also brings cost savings to the national patent 
offices.236  There is a significant shortage of qualified patent examiners 
worldwide.  National patent offices are continually forced to add significant 
numbers of new examiners.237  At the same time, the number of patent 
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applications filed has grown significantly in recent years.238  In many 
countries, this increase in applications has stemmed from foreign applicants, 
as the number of domestic applications has stayed relatively level.239  
Harmonization can help simplify the task of the patent examiners by 
allowing examiners in different national offices to work together to reduce 
the costs of searching for prior art.240  A more primitive version of such 
cooperative effort already exists, in the form of the international search 
provided by PCT applications.  However, greater harmonization would 
enable national offices to cooperate even more closely.  Ultimately, the goal 
would be for the patent laws to be harmonized to the point that offices would 
be able to recognize examination results from other offices.241  
Harmonization can also mitigate the problem of companies that free-
ride on patented inventions in countries where those inventions are not 
patented.242  The concern here is the same one that underlies the patent 
system.  National patent systems were created to protect companies that 
invest in developing new technologies.243  A patent on a new technology 
ensures that the innovating company can capitalize on its invention by 
preventing competitors from immediately copying the invention and driving 
the price down. 244  If a company doubts that it will be able to get a return on 
its investment, it will likely choose not to make the investment at all.245  
Similarly, when some countries have lower levels of patent protection than 
others, companies in countries with higher levels of protection will be less 
likely to invest in an invention because they know that the invention will 
immediately be copied in countries with a lower level of protection.246  Thus, 
the citizens of the country with the lower level of protection benefit at the 
expense of the citizens with the higher level of protection.  Substantive 
harmonization creates minimum standards and helps avoid this type of free-
riding. 
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C. The Proposed Standard Would Improve the Chances of Harmonizing 
the Law for Software Patents 
The WIPO group working on the Substantive Patent Law Treaty has 
reached an impasse on the question of patentable subject matter.247  This 
stems in large part from the significant differences in standards for business 
method patents between the United States and other countries, such as 
Japan.248 
The United States could improve the prospects for agreement on 
harmonization through unilateral action.  The United States significantly 
changed its patent law between the breakdown of PLT negotiations in 1993 
and the resumption of negotiations in 2000.249  Changes such as the eighteen 
month publication requirement and the introduction of the provisional 
application reduced the differences between U.S. and foreign patent laws 
and made it easier for the parties to reach compromises to agree on the 
PLT.250  In fact, that process is continuing, since the latest patent reform 
efforts will bring the United States even closer to international standards by 
switching the U.S. system to a first-to-file system and by eliminating the 
best mode requirement, which is another U.S.-only requirement.251 
In a similar way, adopting the Japanese standard for patentable subject 
matter would reduce the differences that treaty negotiators would have to 
confront in order to reach an agreement on substantive patent law 
harmonization.  The U.S. standard is much looser than the Japanese 
standard.  It is even more generous when compared to the European 
standard, which specifically excludes patents on “programs for 
computers.”252  Developing nations also tend to support some form of 
technology requirement.253  Since the United States is the outlier, it should 
be the first to make the change, in order to support the goal of 
harmonization.  Of course, even if the United States adopts the Japanese 
standard, there will still be significant differences.  However, if two of the 
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three main patent regimes, i.e. the United States and Japan, had the same 
standard in this area, they could build sufficient momentum to push 
negotiations forward.  In addition, such a concession by the United States in 
this area would help to encourage progress in other areas of harmonization 
negotiations. 
By adopting the Japanese standard for patenting software and business 
methods, the United States could help further substantive patent law 
harmonization.  Thus, the advantages for harmonization are another 
significant reason to adopt the standard.   
VIII. CONCLUSION 
Since State Street, the U.S. courts have set too broad a standard for 
patenting business methods.  The current standard allows useful software 
patents, but also allows too many patents on pure business methods.  These 
business method patents tend to be of lower quality and are unnecessary to 
achieve the goal of encouraging innovation in business.  In addition, 
business method patents are inconsistent with the basic understanding that 
patents should be granted for inventions that are technological.  The United 
States should limit these business method patents by merging its standard for 
patenting business methods with the Japanese standard.  This would limit 
business method patents while still allowing useful software patents.  It 
would also encourage patent law harmonization by narrowing the 
differences between the major negotiating countries.   
